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DE JURE INTEGRATION
IN EDUCATION
BERNARD E. GEGAN*

N

OT INFREQUENTLY in the growth of the law a phrase initially em-

ployed in defense of some right has its strongest and most enduring influence, not in nurturing the right, but in definitively limiting or
crippling it against later and more carefully aimed attacks. Perhaps
the most prominent instance of this process began with Mr. Chief Justice Waite's use of the phrase "business affected with a public interest"
in sustaining the first state regulations of the rates of railroads and grain
storage warehouses.' The artless invocation of a phrase used more than
two hundred years earlier by Lord Chief Justice Hale as but one ground
of public regulatory power soon became the vehicle for severe restriction of state competence to legislate in these areas.2 No doubt further
examples immediately come to the reader's mind.
A similar process seems to have manifested itself in a recent article
in The Catholic Lawyer by Professor Charles E. Rice entitled "The
Legality of De Facto Segregation."' The article analysed the constitutionality of the various measures that have either been proposed or undertaken to remedy the disadvantages thought inherent in racially imbalanced schools. Such measures include strategic site selection, open
transfer plans, non-geographic attendance zoning, the Princeton Plan
of paired schools with a correspondingly larger attendance zone, and
school busing.
With the possible exception of an open transfer plan, the conclusion reached by Professor Rice was that measures of the kind sketched
above are violative of the fourteenth amendment's requirement of equal
protection of the laws. The main text invoked in support of the thesis

* Assistant Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law; Member of
the New York Bar.
'Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
2Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Rel., 262 U.S. 522 (1923); Ribnik v.
McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928); Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235
(1929); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932). Not until the
decision in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), was the balance restored
with the upholding of New York's milk industry regulations.

3Rice, The Legality of De Facto Segregation, 10 CATHOLIC LAW. 309 (1964).
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was the now famous dissent of Mr. Justice
Harlan (1) in Plessy v. Ferguson,4 in which
he said: "Our Constitution is color-blind,
and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens. In respect of civil rights,
all citizens are equal before the law."' As
formulated by Professor Rice, "the issue is
whether we should strive for a color-blind
society or accept one in which, for some
purposes, we officially sanction an attitude
of color-consciousness." 6 The reference in
Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion is thus seen
as a constitutional "first principle" limiting
the power of any state to weigh the racial
factor in determining educational or other
policy, notwithstanding the intended or
probable social effect of the measure
adopted. Nor would Professor Rice limit
judicial scrutiny to cases where the law
in its actual administration classifies individuals according to race-as typified by
school segregation before Brown v. Board
of Educ.7 Principle demands evenhanded
adherence to the line of cases invalidating
legislation nonracial in form but having a
"dominant purpose" of racial segregation
or disenfranchisement. If the equal protection rule invalidates gerrymandered districts resulting in segregated education,
then so does it prohibit districts drawn to
strike a racial balance.
Thus has Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent
rewritten itself. I do not wish to be understood, however, as saying that some early
defensive formulation of a principle is
never the final measure of its place in the
law. It may well turn out to be such a
maximum; and not the less so because adU.S. 537 (1896).
5 Id. at 559.
6.Rice, supra note 3, at 317.
347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Brown v. Board
of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
4163

vocated by those who question its judicial
recognition as a minimum., Accordingly, it
is to the merits that we now turn.
Equal Protection: The Principle

Since Professor Rice relies on Mr. Justice Harlan's contemporary exposition of
the equal protection clause, it is appropriate to begin here with other judicial expressions of the "original" understanding.9
Speaking of the Civil War Amendments,
Mr. Justice Miller confidently wrote in The
Slaughter-House Cases:
The most cursory glance at these articles
discloses a unity of purpose, when taken
in connection with the history of the times,
which cannot fail to have an important
bearing on any question of doubt concerning their true meaning. . . . Fortunately that history is fresh within the
memory of uis all, and its leading features,
as they bear upon the matter before us,
free from doubt. 10
Coming to the equal protection clause, the
Justice said:
In the light of the history of these amendments, and the pervading purpose of them,
which we have already discussed, it is
not difficult to give a meaning to this
clause. The existence of laws in the States
where the newly emancipated negroes re-

"And, although a decent regard for the essentials of our system of divided powers would have
counselled, if not commanded, that the elimination of the 'separate but equal' pattern be accomplished by constitutional amendment rather
than by judicial decree, nevertheless we can all
rejoice that our law no longer countenances the
institution of legal segregation." Rice, supra
note 3, at 318.
!,See generally Frank & Munro, The Original
Understanding of "Equal Protection of the
Laws," 50 COLUM. L. REV. 131 (1950); Bickel,
The Original Understanding and the Segregation
Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955).

1 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 67-68 (1873).

II
sided, which discriminated with gross
injustice and hardship against them as a
class, was the evil to be remedied by this
clause, and by it such laws are forbidden."
In Strauder v. West Virginia," after declaring that the law must be the same for
black as for white, the Court gave the reason why as follows:
The words of the amendment, it is true,
are prohibitory, but they contain a necessary implication of a positive immunity,
or right, most valuable to the colored race,
-the right to exemption from unfriendly
legislation against them distinctively as
colored,-exemption from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society,
lessening the security of their enjoyment
of the rights which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards reducing them to the condition of a subject
race.1"
Again in Ex Parte Commonwealth of Virginia: "They [the Amendments] were intended to take away all possibility of op14
pression by law because of race or color.'
This brief canvass may be appropriately
closed with an admonition of Mr. Justice
Harlan in The Civil Rights Cases:I cannot resist the conclusion that the
substance and spirit of the recent amendments to the Constitution have been sacrificed by a subtle and ingenious verbal
criticism. "It is not the words of the law
but the internal sense of it that makes the
law: the letter of the law is the body; the
sense and reason of the law is the soul.' 0
And further on in his opinion:
If the constitutional Amendments be enforced, according to the intent with which,
IId. at 81.
12100 U.S. 303 (1880).
IId. at 307-08.
14 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880).

11109 U.S. 3 (1883).

Id. at 26 (dissenting opinion).
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as I conceive, they were adopted, there
cannot be, in this republic, any class, with
power in the latter to dole out to the
former just such privileges as they may
choose to grant. The supreme law of the
land has decreed that no authority shall
be exercised in this country upon the
basis of discrimination, in respect of civil
rights, against freeman and citizens because of their race, color or previous
7
condition of servitude.1
These are all, of course, rather spacious
observations, and do not necessarily refute
the construction Professor Rice has placed
upon the equal protection clause. They do,
however, have a different emphasis and reflect less abstract objectives than an isolated reference to Mr. Justice Harlan's
"color-blind" phrase might otherwise suggest. Clearly, the amendments are not so
specific in intent as to be confined in their
operation to the Negro race, as was at first
intimated." s There has been, however, running throughout the course of the adjudged
cases, the notion that only "hostile" or "discriminatory" legislation is barred by the
equal protection clause. In Yick Wo v.
Hopkins,1 an ordinance of the City of San
Francisco was invalidated because it was
so administered as to make irresistible the
conclusion "that no reason for it exists except hostility to the race and nationality
to which the petitioners belong, and which
in the eye of the law is not justified. The
discrimination is therefore, illegal ...."20
Even in the breach was this rule honored.

In upholding an Alabama statute that punished with increased severity adultery or

fornication between Negro and white, the
17 Id. at 62 (dissenting opinion).
ISSlaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,
67-72 (1873).

19 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
2-1
Id. at

374. (Emphasis added.)
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Court conceded that the purpose of the
equal protection clause "was to prevent
hostile and discriminating state legislation
against any person or class of persons."21
And in Plessy v. Ferguson the Court felt
obliged to commit the memorable statement:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the
plaintiff's argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of
the two races stamps the colored race with
a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is
not by reason of anything found in the
act, but solely because the colored race
chooses to put that construction upon it.-22
Another protestation of adherence to the
"no hostility" version of the equal protection clause came in Korematsu v. United
States,2 3 in which the Court found no discriminatory purpose in the wartime exclusion of Japanese-Americans from their
homes in designated areas of the West
Coast. "Pressing public necessity may
sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions," the Court said, "racial antagonism never can."-"' Nor was the landmark
2
decision in The School Segregation Case .7,
a departure from the equal protection doctrine as theretofore understood. It was
simply a recognition that legal segregation
was nothing more than the imposition of
disadvantages because of race, i.e., hostility-an everyday fact of life, the overdue recognition of which became the focus
of controversy because of the Court's insistence on "that elaborate demonstration
21 Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 584 (1882).
22 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
23 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see also Hirabayashi v.

United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
24 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216

(1944).
25Brown

(1954).

v. Board of Educ., 347

U.S. 483

of the obvious by methods that are obscure which isthe hallmark of so much
current social science . "...26
It is against this background that for the
first time in our history we see the adoption of measures that truly come within the
animating spirit of "no hostility"-measures designed to upgrade the social position of the Negro without any implication
of antagonism toward the white majority.
After long adherence to the "no hostility"
formulation through so many instances of
de facto hostility toward minorities, this
perspective is of some weight in evaluating
the argument now made that the old understanding be abandoned in favor of withdrawal to the high ground of psychological
color-blindness.
There are many perspectives from which
to appraise evenhandedness in the law and
we must never forget that the moral force
of the rule of law depends fully as much
upon giving the appearance of doing justice as upon the various theories of justice
itself. Of course, appearances do not determine constitutional realities; yet what
student of the Court's work would say that
they have not had their constructive place
in the timing and content of "principled"
decisions.
As noted above, the Court in The School
26 Freund, Civil Rights and the Limits of Law,

14

BUFFALO

The

L. REV. 199, 200 (1964). See Black,

Lawftuness of the Segregation

Decisions,

69YALE L. J. 421, 430 n.25 (1960): "The charge
that it is 'sociological' is either a truism or a
canard - a truism if it means that the Court,
precisely like the Plessy Court, and like innumerable other courts facing innumerable other
issues of law, had to resolve and did resolve a
question about social fact; a canard if it means
that anything like principal reliance was placed on
the formally 'scientific' authorities, which are
relegated to a footnote and treated as merely corroboratory of common sense."

l1 CATHOLIC
Segregation Case did not put its decision
on the ground of constitutional colorblindness. Rather, the opinion is instinct with
the judgment that the pretext of separatebut-equal could no longer disguise the hostility and racial antagonism inherent in
segregation by law. Whatever criticisms
may be levelled at the Court's opinion as
an example of the judicial art, there is wisdom in its explicit application of the formal
doctrine to the existing social situation. It
was no sport of history that the Brown case
was decided when it was. If ever there was
an idea whose time had come it was the
renunciation of the institution of segregation by law as America had known it for a
hundred years; and the living realities had
their legitimate share of the opinion.
Surely, to whatever people whose archeologists may examine our State Papers in
some future time, the decision as it is
written will convey a truer aspect of our
law than would a more abstract or detached exposition of the equal protection
doctrine.
Nothing said here implies disagreement
with the insistence of distinguished scholars that the Supreme Court must judge
with neutrality of principle." 7 If some proposition is given constitutional sanction then
it must be applied to all who come within its terms, however differently and passionately we might value them on scales of
a different order. Typical are Professor
Wechsler's examples: "a labor union or a
taxpayer, a negro or a segregationist, a
corporation or a communist. ."..-21 Unless
the difference can be translated into terms
of the principle-and this by criteria of
relevance inferable from or at least con27 Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
211ld. at 12.
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sistent with the principle itself 29-they must
be ignored or the principle abandoned.
Neutrality of principle, however, tells us
not so much about deriving the principle
in the first place as about the limitations
principles impose on those institutions that
try to be governed by them. A reading of
the vital principle of The School Segregation Case as necessarily resting on the social effect of segregation as we knew it3° is
not lacking in neutrality in the somewhat
elusive sense in which I from time to time
understand that requirement.
It is of course possible to argue that the
equal protection clause, in aiming at the
long-run goal of racial justice for the
Negro, shut the door on a very wide range
of legislative experimentation, including
measures designed to further as well as
to frustrate that end. Such a drastic reading, however, has not yet been given the
clause. In the most recent case involving
the question, the Court was confronted
with a Florida statute penalizing, without
proof of intercourse, habitual nocturnal cohabitation of Negro and white.3 1 In holding the statute unconstitutional, the Court
significantly refrained from holding racial
classifications per se invalid. Adhering to
the approach established in previous equal
protection cases, the Court concluded:
"There is involved here an exercise of the
state police power which trenches upon the
constitutionally protected freedom from
invidious official discrimination based on
race."3 2 Recognizing that the equal protec29 See

BICKEL, THE

LEAST DANGEROUS

BRANCH

58-59, 63 (1962).
30 See Black, supra note 26, at 421.
31 McLaughlin v. Florida, U.S. - (1964).
32 Id. at _.
The adherence to the purpose of
equal protection is explicit: "But we deal here
with a classification based upon the race of the
participants, which must be viewed in light of
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tion clause must be applied in light of the
value it embodies, the Court has not yet
confessed an inability to distinguish individually measures fairly aimed at nurturing the value from those expressing a rejection of it. Should the Court ever conclude that the door is shut on the former
it will be because of uniquely legal considerations of administrability, not a rejection
of the inner merits of the distinction. This
constitutional estimate of the level of generality of formulation beneath which we
cannot regard case by case winnowing as
trustworthy is itself one of prudence, legal
art and faith, not compromise with "principle." In whatever way this estimate,
necessarily empirical, finally stabilizes itself in the cases, it will be the fruit of the
Court's own best judgment, uncoerced by
absolutes of "colorblindness" coming to us
as logical emanations from the text of the
equal protection clause. Critics of this
process would do well to heed the admonition of Mr. Justice Holmes that "the provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas having their essence in
their form; they are organic living institutions transplanted from English soil. Their
significance is vital not formal; it is to be
gathered not simply by taking the words
and a dictionary, but by considering their
origin and the line of their growth." 33
Legislation Nonracial on Its Face
Beyond the methodological limitations
imposed by the equal protection clause on
classificatory schemes, there is a more subthe historical fact that the central purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate racial
discrimination emanating from official sources in
the States." Id. at
33

__

.

Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610

(1914).

stantive aspect to the clause that has been
recognized by the cases. Somewhat akin
to the thrust of the due process clause, it
has been held to bar the accomplishment
of discriminatory ends notwithstanding the
operative "equality" of the means. The
case of Shelley v. Kraemer" is put on this
ground in an illuminating passage from
Tussman and tenBroek's landmark article
on equal protection:
Whatever the reasons, however, the substantive use of the equal protection clause
is a fact. In this role it takes under its
protection certain rights and prohibits their
infringement. Thus the rights of white sellers and Negro buyers may not be interfered with, and it is no answer to say that
the rights of Negro sellers and white
buyers are equally interfered with. The
equal protection clause is held to be violated simply by the invasion of this substantive right no matter how "equally"
35
the invasion is conducted.

It is significant that in the companion
case to the Brown decision the Court, lacking an equal protection clause applicable
to the District of Columbia, expressly relied on the due process clause of the fifth
amendment.36
Thus, where no overtly racial classification is drawn by a statute, any challenge
must rely on the substantive aspect of
equal protection. For example, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot" the Court was confronted
with an Alabama statute that changed the
boundaries of the City of Tuskegee from a
square to "an uncouth twenty-eight sided
34 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
3 Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of
the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. Ri-v. 341, 364 (1949).

See also Mr. Justice Black's explanation of the
Shelley case in his dissenting opinion in Bell v.
Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 318 (1964).
36Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
37 364 U.S. 339 (1960).

I1
figure" with the resulting exclusion from
the city of "all save four of its 400 Negro
voters while not removing a single white
voter or resident. "' s While resting the decision on the fifteenth amendment's prohibition against racial disenfranchisement,
the conclusion is irresistible that the equal
protection clause would have sufficed had
a civil right other than the ballot been
denied. This indeed has been the analysis in numerous cases since Brown, i.e.,
the finding of equal protection violations in
school districts gerrymandered so as to
insure segregated education.' As the late
Judge Clark put it in Taylor v. Board of
Educ. :to "In short, race was made the basis
for school districting, with the purpose and
effect of producing a substantially segregated school. This conduct clearly violates
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board
of Education of Topeka. . . ."'I
The issue raised by Professor Rice and
which now arises here is whether a constitutional mandate of color blindness invalidates equally all governmental action
which takes race into account, however
benevolent and lacking in antagonism its
purpose and effect might be. To be sure,
this is a broad formulation but it is not
made of straw. No narrower objection can
account for Professor Rice's condemnation

3s Id. at 341.
39 E.g., Clemons v. Board of Educ., 228 F.2d
853 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1006
(1956); Taylor v. Board of Educ., 294 F.2d 36
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961).
For a history of the Taylor litigation, see Kaplan,
Segregation Litigation and the Schools-Part 1:
The New Rochelle Experience, 58 Nw. U.L.
REV. 1 (1964); Jackson v. Pasadena School Dist.,
59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P.2d 878 (1963).
40 Supra note 39.

'I IId. at 39.
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of the reasoning in Balaban v. Rubin4 2- as
"erroneous in theory and pernicious in
effect."
Before the court in Balaban was a plan
of the New York City Board of Education
for the construction and districting of a
new junior high school. It was conceded
that the site was selected and the attendance zone drawn so as to achieve a racially
balanced student body. The plan was challenged by white pupils who would have attended another school had the new school
not been built. The zoning, it was alleged,
denied them equal protection of the laws
and violated Section 3201 of the New York
Education Law, which provides that "no
person shall be refused admission into or
be excluded from any public school in the
state of New York on account of race,
creed, color or national origin." Noting that
"boundary lines for attendance at a new
school must be fixed somewhere," the court
upheld the proposal as a reasonable exercise of the Board's discretion. Sounding a
theme recurrent in the cases, the court defended the zone as having "no tendency to
'' 43
foster or produce racial segregation.
Professor Rice is somewhat off the mark
when he criticizes the Balaban case as involving a classification by race. One is, of
course, privileged to have an expansive
idea of what constitutes classification by
race.'
Yet, the difference between overt
classification by race and functionally nonracial measures adopted out of racial considerations is significant in an equal protection analysis. As the cases previously
14 N.Y.2d 193, 199 N.E.2d 375, 250 N.Y.S.2d
281 (1964).
2Id. at 199, 199 N.E.2d at 377-78, 250 N.Y.S.2d
at 284; accord, Jackson v. Pasadena School Dist.,
supra note 39.
-1 Rice, supra note 3, at 319.
42
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discussed demonstrate, one may properly
regard racial distinctions drawn by a statute as "constitutionally suspect."''
One
may even argue for an absolute "colorblindness" in the sense that some traits
may never be the basis of a constitutional
classification. But how can a classification
by race be condemned as per se unconstitutional if no such classification is made?
The purely formal nature of Professor
Rice's version of the equal protection requirement simply cannot cope with a case
in which the measure does not assume a
racial form. In cases such as Taylor and
Balaban, the only possible objection is that
the zoning produces a constitutionally prohibited effect. Coming to the heart of the
matter, Balaban can be disposed of on the
same analysis as Taylor only if the judgment is made that the de jure promotion of
desegregation (or, if you will, integration)
is the same prohibited evil as segregation.
Recurring to fundamentals, segregation by
law is wrong essentially because it places
the segregated group in an inferior position. Can the same be said of integration?
Does it express a hostile suppression of the
dominant group into which the minority
is integrated? I do not understand Professor Rice or anyone else to say so. Without such an objective effect, of what significance is race-consciousness? As Professor Paul Freund put it in a recent lecture:
[A] legislature or a school board ought
to be able to take account of the facts of
segregation in the interest of promoting
long-run de facto desegregation, which is
surely a legitimate aim. This is the position taken by both the New York Court
of Appeals and the New Jersey Supreme
Court, there being no issue in the cases

of requiring integration constitutionally but
only of permitting the race factor to be
taken into account by a school board disposed to do so, without violating the
principle of color blindness. This is a
question of educational and social policy,
a choice of means to a legitimate end,
the encouragement of desegregation, as
segregation itself would be an illegitimate
46
end.
A rigorous pursuit of the chimera of
color-unconsciousness (as it might be more
accurately called) in a Balaban-type situation could only result in gross absurdities.
If an intentional selection of a school site
in the heart of a Negro ghetto would, as
well it might, be regarded as deliberate
perpetuation of segregation,4 7 and if Professor Rice's rule would condemn a similar design to integrate the attendance zone,
the school board's only recourse would be
to pin the tail on the donkey-hardly a
rational prescription for city planning. The
simple fact is, unlike the known evils flowing from segregated education, the racially
balanced school zone inflicts legal injury
on no one. Did the petitioners in Balaban
have a constitutional right or a legitimate
interest not to be assigned to a public
school also attended by pupils of other
races? Did they have a constitutional right
to attend the school nearest their homes?
There are, of course, many factors weighing against manipulation of the neighborhood school pattern in the name of racial
balancing, such as inconvenience, transportation hazards, parental participation in
school activities, and the desires of the
pupil and parent to "enjoy the security of
going to school with children who come
4r

45The phrase is from Boiling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497, 499 (1954).

47

Freund, supra note 26, at 205.
Taylor v. Board of Educ., supra note 39; Jef-

fers v. Whitley, 309 F.2d 621 (4th Cir. 1962).

11
from a similar background. ' 48 These, and
other considerations of prudence and judgment, however, are properly for the legislature or school board-not for constitutional law.
Thus, Professor Rice fails to give due
weight to a fundamental point when he
supports his constitutional attack with the
following:
Nor is racial balancing essential for the
improvement of public education. There
is no necessary correlation between integration as such and the quality of education received in a school (citing articles in
The National Review and the New York
4
Times Magazine) .
First, it is irrelevant that there may be no
necessary correlation between integrated
schools and superior education. Nor need
integration be essential to quality education. As long as there may be such a correlation, the legislature may, under familiar
principles, act on such a belief. Secondly,
even if a state wishes to use its public
schools as tools for the accomplishment of
otherwise legitimate social goals apart from
education in the conventional sense, the
question is one of state policy, not constitutional necessity.
Benevolent Racial Classifications
There is an appealing symmetry in the
statement in the Virginia District Court
case quoted by Professor Rice: "The Federal Constitution is color blind. It is equally
as unconstitutional to discriminate against
a white man as it is to discriminate against
a colored man. . .-50 Yet, firmly believ48 Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools:
The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REV.
564. 567 (1965).
4 Rice, supra note 3, at 319.
50 Rice, supra note 3, at 318 n.52, quoting from
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ing the final justification of law to be not
in its symmetry but in its effect on the
people and the common good, and further,
appreciating the difference in effect on the
subject of a racial distinction depending on
whether he is black or white, I must confess doubt. First, there is clearly no moral
equivalence. When dealing with a benevolent quota or a racially schematized pupil
transfer plan, the distinctions there drawn
stand on the same contingent moral ground
as taxing the rich more than the poor or
providing public food for the hungry but
not for the well-fed.
It may well be that refined moral gradations that justify Sub specie aeternatis
some racial distinction should not find expression in civil law by way of explicit
racial qualifications for certain purposes,
but it isn't necessarily so and the Supreme
Court has not yet said it is so. In McLaughlin v. Florida, decided only last December, the Court restated the historic
policy against discrimination that underlies
the equal protection clause and then canvassed its rule on explicit racial classifications:
This strong policy renders racial classifications "constitutionally suspect," Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499, and subject
to the "most rigid scrutiny," Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216, and
"in most circumstances irrelevant" to any
constitutionally acceptable legislative purpose, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81, 100."
Yet the Court drew short of outlawing all
legislative classifications along racial lines.
There is no purpose to a "rigid scrutiny"
unless there are cases that might survive it.
Should the scrutiny reveal a non-discrimDixon v. Duncan, 218 F. Supp. 157, 160 (E.D.

Va. 1963).
51

U.S.

-

(1964).
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inatory or benevolent purpose, the policy
of equal protection is not violated. It may
be forcefully objected that the courts will
thereby become engaged in a hopeless mire
of legislative psychoanalysis, probing for
hostility of motive or a "realistic racism,
which desires to continue as much compulsory segregation as the authorities can
be brought to tolerate." '2" The courts may,
however, cope with "tokenism" and delay
without abandoning the enterprise of individual "rigid scrutiny" by use of the presumption of invalidity clearly indicated in
McLaughlin. 3
Statutes governing the use of racial
classification for selected purposes may, of
course, impose tighter restrictions than the
equal protection clause. Section 3201 of
the New York Education Law, construed
in the Balaban case, states flatly that "no
person shall be refused admission into or
be excluded from any public school on account of race, creed, color or national
origin." This is very positive language and
its mandate seems to leave little room for
recourse to the anti-hostility purpose of the
fourteenth amendment as an aid to interpretation. lf, in administering some quota
system, an individual should apply to a
school and be informed that he is of the
wrong race under the quota allocations,
BICKEL, op. cit. supra note 29, at 62.
"Our inquiry, therefore, is whether there
clearly appears in the relevant materials some
overriding statutory purpose requiring the proscription of the specified conduct when engaged in
by the white person and a Negro, but not other52

.93

wise. Without such justification the racial classification . . . is reduced to an invidious discrimination forbidden by the Equal Protection
Clause." McLaughlin v. Florida, supra note 31,
at _.
See also the use of the presumption of

invalidity in Professor Pollak's reconstruction of
the Brown decision. Pollak, Racial Discrimination
and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor
Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1959).

section 3201 seemingly is violated. The
application of racial distinctions on an individualized basis as a criterion for admission to school is deemed impermissible
without regard to the purpose and long
range effect of the scheme. Whatever the
constitutional requirements, there is much
to be said for the wisdom of a statute
which avoids the personal impact of an
official informing an applicant that he is
of the wrong race or color. Section 3201,
if so read, also avoids embroilment in ugly
administrative attempts to classify in one
category or another persons of multi-racial
ancestry. Statutes such as section 3201,
while defensible enough as a legislative
judgment regarding the use of explicit
racial classifications, should not be regarded as the constitutional measure of the
competence of another legislature which
does essay some experiment fairly designed
to further desegregated schooling; the cases
leave that much open. Less still should it
be regarded as having any effect on measures directed at that end that are nonracial in form and function.
The final argument marshalled by Professor Rice against the "racial balancers"
is as follows: "Interestingly, the entire concept of racial balancing carries with it an
inevitable implication that Negroes are inferior."5 4 The point insisted on by the
"racial balancers" is that the insinuations
inherent in racial imbalance adversely
affect the "ghettoized" minority; not that
the members of the minority group are
themselves inferior. The belief of adverse
effect may or may not be well founded.
However, the most that can defensibly be
argued is that racial balancing in the
schools is mistaken in its premises and un54 Rice, supra note 3, at 320.
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productive or counterproductive in its
effects. One who, in addition, believes that
corrective legislation "stamps the colored
race with a badge of inferiority" does so,
again culling from Plessey v. Ferguson,
"solely because he chooses to put that con'5
struction upon it."
Legislation designed to integrate racial
minorities into the mainstream of society
carries no connotation of inferiority not also
present in any legislation enacted to assist
a socially or economically disadvantaged
class. And I know of no responsible person who would argue today that welfare
or other anti-poverty legislation bespeaks
a judgment that the recipient is an inferior
being. Far from the belief of Professor
Rice, I find in such measures a profound
expression of faith in the capacity of the
Negro people to overcome the handicaps
that have been placed upon them.
Must Balancing Measures Be Adopted?
A survey, however fragmentary, of the
problems raised by de facto segregation
can hardly close without taking at least
a passing glance at the assertion that the
Constitution compels affirmative state action to eliminate de facto segregation.
While there is some language in the
Brown case that might indicate that de
facto segregation is a denial of equal protection of the laws,5 6 it is clear that so-

cial inequalities do not per se support a
constitutional claim for a governmental
cure. This is sufficiently demonstrated by
the subsequent proceedings in the Brown
case-as detailed in Professor Rice's article.57 Difficult problems arise when non5 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
"Separate educational facilities are inherently
unequal." Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483, 495 (1954).
57Rice, supra note 3, at 313-14.
56

racial geographic school zones are superimposed on segregated residential areas
which, until recently, may have been par58
tially maintained as such by state action.
However, a recent analysis has gone considerably beyond the cases where state
sanction is but slightly removed from the
de facto condition. 0 In sharp contrast to
the view that adherence to traditional geographic criteria in school zoning is constitutionally permissible, a large field of
affirmative state responsibility is seen as
created by the Brown decision. Wholly
apart from residual state responsibility
arising from recently abandoned legal segregation, the mere adherence to geographic
"neighborhood" zoning with knowledge of
the attendant imbalance is said to support
an attribution of "state action" to the unequal condition. A constitutional obligation to correct the inequality of educational
opportunity should be found, it is argued,
unless the failure to do so is "justified."
Justification is to be determined by balancing the nondiscriminatory interests served
by adherence to geographic zoning against
the inequality of educational opportunity
resulting from such adherence. 60 This brief
summary does not, I am sure, do justice to
all of the nuances of analysis supporting
the thesis. Yet the attenuated character of
the legal and factual inferences necessary
to support the analysis must be apparent
to even the casual reader. With the possible exception of instances of residual
state responsibility referred to above, the

-1 Although Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60
(1917), struck down racial zoning forty-eight
years ago, it was not until 1948 that judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants was
eliminated. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
-9 Fiss, supra note 48, at 584.
60 Id. at 584, 608-12.
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conventional doctrine is that the fourteenth
amendment forbids segregation but does
not require integration. The numerous
cases so holding are reviewed by Professor Rice in his article and need not be
restated here. The fundamental constitutional values they embody, together with a
due regard for the role of the judiciary in
vetoing the intolerable versus accomplishing the desirable, 1 point to the responsible
policy-making agencies of government as
the proper source of racially corrective
measures having the necessary prudence,
flexibility and public support.
The only forceful argument against reliance on the normal political process lies
when the interests of the group to be benefited are prevented from being pressed on
the political scales. Thus argues Mr. Fiss:
"The Negro has strenuously exerted whatever political power he may have; to delegate further the task of making the critical empirical and normative judgments to
the political process might well involve
greater human and social costs than establishing a tradition of judicial review. ' ' -'
Such an outlook is pregnant with serious
implications at any time; but appealing as
it may have been a few years ago, time and
events have destroyed its premises. Complaints of sectional "tokenism" and delay in implementation of the Brown mandate received a national response in the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, not to mention

61"Because

the Court is without power to shape
measures for dealing with the problems of society -but has merely the power of negation over
measures shaped by others, the indispensable
judicial requisite is intellectual humility, and
such humility presupposes complete disinterestedness." American Fed'n of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 557 (1949)

(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
62 Fiss, supra note 48, at 612.

the local proliferation of affirmative measures of the sort discussed in this article.
It is becoming clear that, on the whole, the
course of race relations in the United
States reflects a wholesome interplay between the principle-declaring role of the
Court and the negotiated, measured movement of legislation. To shortcut recognized institutional arrangements for the accomplishment of specific substantive ends
is bad business even when they are seriously nonproductive. To do so when they
are working well is bald opportunism.
Conclusion
If a century of social and political
"standpatism" demonstrated the need for
the galvanizing shock of the Brown decision, the broad front of corrective movement since 1954 presents a striking contrast. While the injection of judicial adrenalin into a sluggish political bloodstream
may have curative results exceeding those
experienced in the physical analogue, I
hopefully assume that none but the most
militant would desire the political patient
to become an addict. The difference between curative and supportive medication
is as crucial in the result as it is insidious
in the transition. Unfortunately, the consequences of addiction for the body politic
are no happier than for the body physical.
"Holding democracy in judicial tutelage is
not the most promising way to foster disciplined responsibility in a people." 63
The typically American tendency, long
ago noted by Tocqueville, to translate political interest into claims of legal right
produces many distortions, not the least of
which was remarked by Mr. Justice (then
(Continued on page 48)
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Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial
Function, 69 HARV. L. REV.217, 229 (1955).

